This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a universal cheap-talk protocol (a polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels) that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.
Introduction
The self-enforcing outcomes of a "silent" game (with no communication) are the set of Nash equilibria (Nash, 1951) . Pre-play mediated communication allows players to implement the larger set of correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974 (Aumann, , 1987 . In many environments, it is hard to find a fair and discrete mediator, and it is natural to ask which agreements can be implemented using only cheap-talk: pre-play, unmediated, non-binding, non-verifiable communication among the players (See Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Forges, 1990; Barany, 1992; Aumann & Hart, 2003; Gerardi, 2004 , and the references within). In this paper we are going to extend two existing results:
• Ben-Porath (2003): The existence of a cheap-talk protocol that allows three or more players to implement any Nash dominating correlated equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the extended game.
• Ben-Porath (1998) and Krishna (2004) : In general such a protocol does not exist for two players.
In "silent" games, coalitional deviations might be considered improbable, due to not having a device to coordinate the joint deviation. However, cheap-talk is a natural coordination device. Resistance against coalitional deviations was discussed in Aumann (1959) and Bernheim et al. (1987) , where strong Nash equilibrium was defined as a Nash equilibrium, which is resistant against a deviation of any coalition (i.e. there is no coalitional deviation that is profitable for all the deviators). Moreno & Wooders (1996) give the correlated counterpart definition: a strong correlated equilibrium.
2
In some real-world environments, while it is easy for small coalitions to deviate from an equilibrium, it is much harder for large coalitions to secretly coordinate a deviation while hiding it from the nondeviating players. 3 One example for such environment is the field of foreign affairs: there are no known examples of secret joint deviations of large coalitions (a few dozens countries), but there are secret joint deviations of small coalitions (a few countries), as in the following examples:
• The secret additional protocol of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) in which two countries have secretly divided between them six neighboring countries.
• The surprising joint attack of Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973 October war.
We therefore introduce two new concepts: 4 k-strong correlated equilibrium and k-strong Nash equilibrium, which require resistance against coalitional deviations of up to k players. We are interested in the question of existence of cheap-talk protocols that can implement a k-strong correlated equilibrium, as a k-strong Nash equilibrium in an extended game with cheap-talk. We would like to note that existing cheap-talk protocols (like Ben-Porath, 2003) can make such an implementation only for the case k=1. We say that a strategy profile q is k-strong punishable if there exists another strategy profile q that is dominated by q even when the players of a coalition with up to k players do a joint scheme (as defined formally in definition 2.5). Our main result is the existence of a general "minorityproof" cheap-talk protocol (a finite polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels) that for every 2 n k < , can implement any k-strong correlated equilibrium (with rational parameters) which is k-strong punishable as a k-strong Nash equilibrium in the extended cheap-talk game. Furthermore, we prove that in general such a protocol does not exist when 2 n k ≥ . Our protocol is based on the k-private protocol presented in Ben-Or et al. (1988) , which deals with fault-tolerant distributed computation (as described in Section 3).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and formal definitions. Section 3 presents the main result. Section 4 shows that in general there are no similar protocols when 2 n k ≥ .
Section 5 gives an example for the applicative use of our protocol. We conclude in Section 6.
Model and Definitions
A finite game in strategic form G is defined as ( , ( ) , ( ) ) 
, and for simplicity we omit the subscript: exists a player i S ∈ such that ( ) ( , )
Observe that a 1-strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, an n-strong Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) , and that the set of (k+1)-strong Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of k-strong Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.2: Given a coalition S N ⊆ , we define an S-deviating scheme as a function
. Given a strategy profile q we say that ) ( A p ∆ ∈ is an S-deviation from the strategy profile q, if there exists a deviating scheme
denote the set of all S-deviations from q.
Thus, a correlated strategy profile p is an S-deviation from another strategy profile q if the members of S, using a plan to correlate their play (which may depend on S-part of the recommendations
chosen by a correlation device according to q), can induce the correlated strategy profile p when each member of the complementary coalition obeys his recommendation.
is a k-strong correlated equilibrium if and only if for every coalition S N ⊆ satisfying S k ≤ , and for every S-deviation
A k-strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile, from which no coalition (with up to k players) has a joint deviation, which makes every member of the coalition better off. Observe that a 1-strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium, the set of (k+1)-strong correlated equilibria is a subset of the set of k-strong correlated equilibria, and that an n-strong correlated equilibrium is a strong correlated equilibrium as defined in Moreno & Wooders (1996) . Other definitions of a strong correlated equilibrium in the literature differ in their assumptions about the gaming framework: whether the players of a deviating coalition can transmit private information and construct a new correlating device, and when coalitions plan their deviations: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) receiving the agreement recommendations. Ex-ante definitions can be found in Milgrom & Roberts (1996) , Moreno & Wooders (1996) , and Ray (1996) , and ex-post definitions can be found in Einy & Peleg (1995) , Ray (1998), and Bloch & Dutta (2007) .
In our framework of cheap-talk pre-play communication, a deviating coalition can use communication channels to share private information and to construct a new correlating device, and can plan deviations before, after or during the process of receiving their recommendations. At first look, the equilibrium defined in definition 2.3 seems to be resistant only against joint deviations that are planned at the ex-ante stage. 5 However, it turns out that in this framework an ex-ante k-strong correlated equilibrium is also an ex-post k-strong correlated equilibrium (see Heller, 2008) . The intuition is that a decision to play an S-deviation is common knowledge in S . This allows the use of interactive epistemology (Aumann, 1976) to show that one can assume w.l.o.g. that all the deviators in a profitable ex-post S-deviation share the same posterior belief about the distribution of S a . Using this, it is possible to "emulate" any profitable ex-post S-deviation by a profitable ex-ante S-deviation.
Similar to the existing definitions of a strong correlated equilibrium, we assume that the deviating players are myopic: they do not take into account the possibility that there may be further deviations.
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Definition 2.4: Given a coalition S N ⊆ , we define an S-replacing scheme as a function
Given a strategy profile q and another strategy profile p ɶ (which we refer to as the "reaction" profile), we say that the profile ) ( A p ∆ ∈ is an S-replacement of the strategy profile q with a reaction profile p ɶ , if there exists a replacing scheme S r , such that for all a A ∈ , we have ( )
denote the set of all S-replacements of q with p ɶ .
Thus, a correlated strategy profile is an S-replacement of the profile ) ( A q ∆ ∈ with a reaction profile p , if it is induced by an S-replacing scheme S r in the following process:
• Given their recommendations S S A a ∈ (chosen by a correlation device according to q) the players of S do a joint lottery.
• With probability ) ( 1 S S a r − they obey their recommendations, and everyone plays according to q.
• With probability ) ( S S a r the correlation device is "replaced", and everyone plays according to p .
Definition 2.5: Given a correlated strategy profile ( ) q A ∈ ∆ , we say that an uncorrelated strategy profile q IA ∈ ɶ is a k-strong punishing strategy profile (for q) if for every coalition S N ⊆ satisfying S k ≤ and for every S-deviation ( , ) p D q S ∈ ɶ ɶ (from q ), the following two conditions hold:
• For every S-replacement (of q with p ) ( , , ) . 6 Assuming otherwise leads to the concepts of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) and of a correlated coalitionproof equilibrium (defined in the literature that was referred to after definition 2.3) 7 The second condition can be omitted if simultaneous messages are allowed (As discussed in Section 6).
A profile q is a k-strong punishable strategy profile if there exists a k-strong punishing profile (for q).
In our cheap-talk protocol (as described in the next section) the players construct together a correlation device that recommends each player what to play according to a k-punishable strategy profile q. The punishing strategy profile q is used to "deter" a coalition S (of up to k players) from using an "S-lie" (defined in Section 3): deviate while communicating with the members of S − in order to "manipulate" the correlation device and induce a new correlation. The properties of our protocol (presented in Section 3) guarantee that any use of an S-lie is detected by a non-deviating player with probability 1 λ < at the ex-ante stage, and with probability 1 at the ex-post stage. If an S-lie is detected, then all the non-deviating players play the (uncorrelated) punishing strategy profile q , and the deviating players deviate from q to an S-deviation
The first condition guarantees that if the detecting probability λ is large enough then every S-lie at the ex-ante stage is not profitable to at least one deviating player (as discussed after definition 2.6).
Assume that the players in S consider the use of an S-lie at the ex-post stage with probability ( ) S S r a (which depends on their recommendations S S A a ∈ ). Because the S-lie is detected with probability 1, the resulting correlated strategy profile that is induced by the S-lie is an S-replacement:
Thus the second condition guarantees that every S-lie at the ex-post stage is not profitable to at least one deviating player.
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Definition 2.6: Given a game G, a coalition S, a k-strong punishable strategy profile q with a k-strong punishing profile q , let the S-punishment be:
min max ( ) ( )
ɶ , and let the minimal punishment be: 
Given a coalition S with up to k players and an S-deviation ( , ) p D q S ∈ ɶ ɶ from the punishing profile q ɶ , one of the deviating players looses a . This is justified due to similar reasons as those discussed after definition 2.3 and in Heller (2008) .
profit a player may earn from replacing the profile q with another profile.
Assume that the players in S consider the use an S-lie at the ex-ante stage (before receiving their recommendations). If the S-lie, is undetected then the profit of any deviating player is at most q w , and if it is detected, then there exists a deviating player ( 
Definition 2.7: Given a game G (with n players), let G be the cheap-talk extended game with the following pre-play talk phase:
• The talk phase includes infinite number of turns.
• According to some commonly known round-robin order, at each turn t, a communicating coalition ( ) S t N ⊆ is chosen, and each of its members simultaneously sends a message to everyone in S(t).
• The messages are taken from some finite alphabet M (that contains the null message φ ).
Playing phase: After the talk phase, each player i simultaneously chooses an action in i A .
We have defined the cheap-talk to be infinite in the spirit of Aumann & Hart (2003) who discuss 2-player games, and show that any artificial restriction on the length of the conversation would limit the set of Nash equilibria in the extended game due to terminal effects propagating backwards (as in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma). Observe that in our definition all coalitions have substantial communication capabilities: every coalition S has an infinite number of turns in which it is the communicating coalition (S=S(t)) and its members can use those turns to share information, plan a deviating scheme and implement a correlating device.
Denote the set of all 0 t -period histories by • ,
( )
∪ -A function according to which player i chooses his messages (when he is included in the communicating coalition, i.e.
-A function according to which i chooses his action in the playing phase.
We use the term protocol to denote an uncorrelated strategy profile in G (an n-tuple ) ,..., (
Given a protocol c and a history h H ∈ , we refer to
n n g h g h as the protocol's action profile or as the (protocol's) recommendations.
Definition 2.8: Given a game G and a cheap-talk extension G , we say that a protocol c is finite if there exists a random variable * t with a finite expected value (which we call the protocol's length), such that for all i and for all
Therefore if all the players follow the finite protocol c, then the functions i g depend non-trivially only on the first * t turns. Observe that only the players who play according to c are bounded by the protocol finiteness. A deviating coalition S can continue to send nonnull messages in turns after * t .
Definition 2.9: Given a game G and a cheap-talk extension G , we say that a protocol c is polite if for every turn t, at most one player sends a message different than φ (the null message).
Definition 2.10: Given a game G and a cheap-talk extension G , we say that a protocol c is using only private 2-player channels if for every turn t in which 2 ) ( > t S , all the players send φ .
Definition 2.11: Given a game G, a cheap-talk extension G and a protocol c, let ( ) c q A ∈ ∆ denote the unique probability according to which actions are chosen at the playing phase, if all the players play in G according to c. Let ( ) q A ∈ ∆ be a strategy profile. We say that a protocol c implements q if c= .
Definition 2.12: Given a game G, a cheap-talk extension G , a protocol c, and a coalition S, we say that another protocol S c is an S-protocol-deviation (from c) if for every
S plays according to c, and only the members of S may deviate).
A Universal Cheap-Talk Minority-Proof Protocol
Theorem 3: Let G be a game with n players, let 2 n k < , let ( ) q A ∈ ∆ be a k-strong correlated equilibrium, which is k-strong punishable, with rational parameters (i.e. ( ) q a is rational a A ∀ ∈ ), and let G be a cheap-talk extended game with a finite alphabet M (which depends on q). Then there exists a finite protocol c (an uncorrelated strategy profile in G ), which implements q and is a k-strong Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, c is a polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels.
A proof of Theorem 3: We first give a detailed constructive description of our protocol c, and then prove that it implements q and that it is a k-strong Nash equilibrium in G . For simplicity of presentation, we assume n to be odd and 2 1 n k = ⋅ + . Our protocol's talk phase is divided into "constructing" phases and "lottery" phases.
The constructing phase is based on the k-private protocol presented in Ben-Or et al. (1988) , which deals with fault-tolerant distributed computation. Their setup includes n players, each holding a secret input i
x , who compute n polynomials ( ) Let d ∈ N be the common denominator of { } ( ) a A q a ∈ , let p ∈ N be a prime number larger than d and all
, let p Z be the finite field of integers modulo p, and let the alphabet
f x ∈ be polynomials over p Z which satisfy the following conditions:
• If x is chosen uniformly over { } 1,..,
is the j i -th action of player j .
•
At the beginning of each constructing phase, each player randomly chooses a secret input i In each lottery phase, the players make a joint lottery: with a large enough probability 1 λ < , all the messages of the last constructing phase are revealed to everyone, each player verify that the recommendation he received is indeed equal to ( ) i f s ɶ , and a new constructing phase is played; with probability 1-p nothing is revealed, the talk phase ends (i.e. since that turn, everyone sends null messages), and the players play the last recommended action. If at any time during the talk phase a deviation from the protocol is revealed, then the players play a punishing strategy profile.
In the next sub-section we describe the details of the constructing phase, and in the following one we describe the details of the lottery phase. The constructive phase is adapted from Ben-Or et al. (1988) , and repeated here to make this paper self contained (some technical details are omitted, see Ben-Or et al., 1988; Goldriech et al., 1987) .
The constructing phase: 
2) Sharing the secret: Each player i N ∈ shares his secret input i p s ∈ Z ɶ among the other players. We begin by presenting a definition for sharing a secret input by a polynomial:
We say that a secret input p s ∈ Z is shared among the players by a polynomial ( ) l x :
• Each player i receives the value of ( ) i l y (i's "share" of the secret).
• For each coalition S with up to k players ( S k ≤ ), the set of shares ( )
independent from the secret input s (i.e. the conditional distribution of s given ( )
l y ∈ is the same as the prior distribution).
In that case, we say that the polynomial ( ) l x encodes the secret input s .
We now describe how the second sub-phase is done. For each player i N ∈ :
• Player i sends player j his share: ( ) 3) Distributed Computations: In this sub-phase the players compute together the values of ( )
while not revealing any information about the secret inputs ( ) for the two simpler computation steps:
• Addition of two secrets: Let , • Multiplication of a secret with a known constant: Let Proof: Matrix multiplication is equivalent to computing n linear functionals. The players can independently compute each functional i r (by using the two computation steps described above:
addition and multiplication by a constant), and reveal the outcome to player i (by sending him their shares of the polynomial that encodes the value of i r ).
Now we show how the players can share the result of a multiplication of two secrets (by a polynomial of degree k). Let , p s s ′ ′′∈ Z be two secret inputs that are shared by the polynomials (of degree k) ( ), ( ) l x l x ′ ′′ . The sharing of s s ′ ′′ ⋅ is done as follows:
Note that the free coefficient of the polynomial ˆ( ) h x is s s ′ ′′ ⋅ . There are two problems to use ˆ( ) h x to encode s s ′ ′′ ⋅ : its non-free coefficients are not random (for example, ( ) h x cannot be irreducible) and its degree is 2 k ⋅ instead of k. We fix those problems by the following two sub-steps.
• Randomization: Each player i randomly selects a polynomial ( ) 
The lottery phase:
Let q IA ∈ ɶ be an uncorrelated punishing strategy profile (for q). Let λ be a rational number satisfying λ ɶ is the minimal detecting probability as defined in 2.6). During the lottery phase, the players perform a joint lottery 11 and with probability λ all the players send everyone all the messages they sent and received in the last constructing-phase ("the revealing sub-phase"). 12 If a player finds out that there was a deviation in the constructing phase (i.e. a sender claims he sent a message a M ∈ while a receiver claims he received another message b M ∈ , or some player i did not do what he was supposed to do, like sending a wrong number in some computation step or choosing a polynomial with a wrong free coefficient), then he tells everyone about it, and then the (non-deviating) players stop communicating (i.e. send a null message for the rest of the infinite talk phase) and play the 11 Assuming λ=l/m (such that l and m are natural), the joint lottery can be done by each player simultaneously tells everyone a random chosen (0,.., 1) i y m ∈ − and comparing y = (y 1 +…+y n ) mod n to l (y<l with probability λ). The lottery can also be implemented by a polite protocol by encoding the secret y i -s by polynomials and computing y. 12 This can be done with only private 2-player channels: in each turn (according to some known round-robin order), player i tells player j a message he has sent/received in the last constructing-phase. After enough turns, all the players receive all the messages sent in the last constructing phase twice (once from the sender and once from the receiver).
punishing strategy profile q ɶ . With probability 1-λ, the content of the last constructing phase is not revealed, the (non-deviating) players stop communicating, and each player plays his part of the action profile of the last constructing phase.
Remarks:
• If all the players received a "0-recommendation" ( , ( ) 0
, which happens when
), then they play the revealing phase with probability 1. If some players claim they received a 0-recommendation while others not, then they play the punishing strategy profile.
• If at any time during the talk phase (not necessarily during the revealing sub-phase), a deviation from the protocol is revealed by a non-deviating player (for example, he receives a null message instead of a number), then the players play the punishing strategy profile q ɶ .
Proving the protocol is a k-strong Nash equilibrium:
Let S be a coalition with up to k players. We have to show that there is no profitable deviation for S, i.e. that in every S-protocol-deviation S c there is a deviating player , S i ∈ such that ( ) ( )
The possible S-protocol-deviations can be divided into a few kinds: choosing numbers in p Z nonuniformly, sharing information, not following S-part of the action profile and S-lies (deviating while communicating with the members of S − in order to change their recommendations). We show that none of those kinds (nor a combination of them) is profitable for S.
Choosing numbers non-uniformly: In the beginning of the constructing phase, each player should randomly choose a secret input i p s ∈ Z ɶ . The fact that the action profile depends only on the sum of those i s ɶ -s, guarantee that choosing i s ɶ in any arbitrary way, does not affect the distribution of the action profile. Later, in the constructing phase, players should choose random coefficients for the polynomials ( ) i p x (in the randomization sub-step). Choosing the values of those coefficients (or of the secret inputs) in any arbitrary way might be done in order to gain information about the action profile, but this is equivalent to sharing information (which is discussed in the next paragraph).
Sharing information: In this deviation, S members follow the protocol c when communicating with members of -S, but deviate when communicating among themselves: in turns when the communicating coalition is S S(t) ∈ , they send messages that contain some information about their secret inputs or about messages they received or sent in earlier parts of the protocol. Such sharing can be done in "silent" turns (when the players are supposed to send null messages). 13 We now show that such sharing does not give the deviating players any non-trivial information about S − part of the action profile:
. In each step of the constructing phase, each player i shares his secret information (his original secret input i s ɶ and new inputs he obtains during the distributed computations sub-phase) by encoding them with random polynomials of degree k. The players of S know at most k shares of any encoding polynomial of a player in S − , and thus the coefficients of those polynomials, and specifically the free coefficient, are completely independent of their shares. Thus, the conditional distribution of ( )
given all the messages the players of S received and sent (and the ( )
the same as the conditional distribution given only ( ) Ben-Or et al., 1988) .
Not following their part of the action profile: The players of S may plan a deviation in the playing phase: playing according to an S-deviating scheme :
instead of following the protocol's action profile. However, the fact that q is a k-strong correlated equilibrium and that c= guarantees that such a deviating scheme is not profitable for at least one player in S.
S-lies:
We define an S-lie as an S-protocol-deviation in which the players of S deviate while communicating with the non-deviating players of S − , and as a result a non-deviating player j S ∉ − receives a different recommendation than ( ) We first deal with S-lies at the ex-ante stage. With probability λ a revealing sub-phase is played after the constructing phase. In the revealing sub-phase, the members of S − share their 1 k + (or more) shares ( ) i j l y of each random polynomial ( ) i l x (of degree k) that was used to encode the secret inputs i s ɶ . This allows each non-deviating player to interpolate the coefficients of all those polynomials, and evaluate the true value of all i s ɶ . Thus the players in S − can check whether any non-deviating player j received a different recommendation than ( ) j f s ɶ . Thus any ex-ante S-lie is detected with probability ,λ λ > ɶ , and definition 2.6 (of the minimal detecting probability ,λ ɶ ) guarantees that any such S-lie is not profitable to at least one player in S.
We now discuss S-lies at the ex-post stage. At least 1 k + non-deviating players in S − send their true shares to each non-deviating player. Thus each player can interpolate his polynomial and evaluate ( ) j f s ɶ based only on the shares received from the non-deviating players. Thus any deviation at that stage (sending a wrong share) is detected with probability 1, and definition 2.5 (of k-strong punishing profile) guarantees that the S-lie is unprofitable to at least one deviating player. QED (theorem 3).
The reader should note that our protocol is not a (k+1)-strong Nash equilibrium, as any coalition with 1 k + players can share their ( ) i j l y -s and know the action profile:
Non-Existence of a Universal Cheap-Talk (n/2)-Proof Protocol
In this section we show by way of examples that for every n, our result is tight: first for 2-player games (example 4.1) and then for general n-player games (example 4.2).
The following example (4.1) shows that there is a 2-player game Ĝ and a (1-strong) correlated equilibrium q which is 1-strong punishable (with rational parameters), such that for every protocol ĉ (an uncorrelated strategy profile in the extended cheap-talk game), which implements q , there is a player with a profitable deviation in the playing phase (thus there is no Nash equilibrium in the extended game with the same payoffs as q ).
Example 4.1 (based on Ben-Porath, 1998): Let Ĝ be a "chicken" game, as described in Table 4 .1 (Alice is the row player and Bob is the column player). Let q be the following correlated equilibrium, which is 1-strong punishable with a punishing profile ) , (
, as described in Table 4 .2: ( , ) 1/ 3 q e e = ). We finish the proof by observing that both players have a profitable deviation from the protocol c in the playing phase of Ĝ : playing Example 4.2 shows that for every n, there exists a game G with 2n players and a n-strong correlated equilibrium ( ) q A ∈ ∆ with rational parameters, which is n-strong punishable, such that in every finite protocol c that implements q (in the extended game G ), there is a coalition with n players that has a profitable coalitional-deviation. In particular there is no n-strong Nash equilibrium in the extended game with the same payoffs as q. • Otherwise (all players in A played the same action as well as all the players in B), the payoff is the same as in example 4.1 (as described in table 4.3).
Let q be the n-strong correlated equilibrium, which is n-strong punishable (with a punishing profile
, that is described in Table 4 .4. Thus in q all players in A play the same action, as do all the players in B. We now formally present the constructions described above. We begin by defining the alphabet and the order of communication in Ĝ :
• The alphabet M in Ĝ is , and similarly for Bob.
• The communicating coalition in turn t in Ĝ is determined according to the communicating coalition in turn t in G :
In order to simplify notation, we relate to an information set of player 0 i in G : We continue by relating each information set of Alice in Ĝ with a set of information sets for each i A A ∈ (and similarly for Bob and B):
• Given an information set of Alice in turn 0 t : . We similarly define dual information sets of Bob and B.
• The dual information sets of the infinite histories and infinite information sets are similarly defined. (measurable) functions according to which they play in the playing phase ( ) ( :
is defined to be null. 16 We similarly define the talking function of Bob. Observe that the constraint mentioned earlier in the definition of a dual information set (if ( ) i S t ∉ then i t m φ = ) always holds (as can be shown by induction on t).
• We define the playing function of Alice : ( ) 
that c is an n-strong Nash equilibrium in G . In the A-protocol-deviation the players in A begin by talking according to the original protocol c until it ends (i.e. until * t ). After c is over, they use some turns in which ( ) S t A = (when they should only send null messages according to the protocol) to fully share their sets of information (i.e. at the end of those turns each player in A knows { } and if it is a mixed strategy they make a joint lottery and play together according to the result). Observe that every player in A earns from the deviation the same profit that Alice earns from the deviation in Ĝ (thus it is a profitable A-deviation).
Remarks about example 4.2:
• Observe that our requirement in the definition of cheap-talk (definition 2.7) that each coalition S has an infinite number of turns in which ( ) S S t = is necessary for the proof of example 4.2. If in a different pre-play communication framework the players can limit the private communication channels of sub-coalitions (for example, at some point the grand coalition can decide that the talking phase ends, and the playing phase is immediately played), then the proof of example 4.2 does not hold.
• Our requirement that c is finite can be replaced by a requirement that the communication order gives the players of A and the players in B enough opportunities to secretly share information. For example, requiring that the order of the communicating coalitions ( ) S t is such that between any two turns in which the players of A communicate with the players of B, there is a turn in which ( ) A S t = and a turn in which ( ) B S t = .
5. An Example for Applicability -a 5-Player "Chicken" Game
In this section, we study a 5-player "chicken" game, in which the use of our "minority-proof" protocol can give a substantial gain to all players. Let G be the following game:
• Each of the 5 players has two pure actions: s ("swerve") and d ("drive straight")
• The payoff function is:
o If all players play s, then everyone gets 4. The presence of a fair mediator allows the players to achieve the following correlated strategy profile q:
• With probability 3 / 8 37.5% = : all the players play s.
• For each of the 10 couples (i,j) where i j ≠ , with probability 1/16 6.25% − : (i,j) play d, while the other players play s.
One can verify that:
• The profile q is a 2-strong correlated equilibrium with a symmetric payoff of 3.5 which is the best 2-strong correlated equilibrium symmetric payoff.
• The profile q is 2-strong punishable (with the punishing strategy ( , , , , )
).
• The payoff of q is strictly better than the best symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibria -3.2. (achieved by choosing each of the ten couples (i,j) with probability 10%, and playing the Nash equilibrium in which (i,j) play d and the others play s.)
We now wish to compare our protocol with the existing protocols in the literature (Barany, 1992; Ben-Porath, 1998; Ben-Porath, 2003; Forges, 1990; Gerardi, 2004) , when a fair mediator does not exist, and the players can only use cheap-talk. These protocols can implement q, but only as a
(1-strong) Nash equilibrium. This implementation is "weak" in the sense that it is possible for two players (for example, players 1 and 2 in Ben-Porath, 2003) to jointly interfere with the protocol and guarantee a payoff of 5 for themselves (and 2 to the other players). Contrary to that, the use of our protocol gives a "stronger" implementation as a 2-strong Nash equilibrium. An analog example can be devised for any odd number of players.
Concluding Remarks:
1) Two possible extensions of our protocol are:
• Implementing a k-coalition-proof correlated equilibrium as a k-coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) in the extended cheap-talk game.
• Implementing a k-strong (or k-coalition-proof) correlated equilibrium of a Bayesian game.
2) Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilibria: A related question is the relation between the various sets of strong correlated equilibria that were defined in the literature. In Heller (2008) we prove that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria (as defined in Moreno & Wooders, 1996) is included in the set of ex-post strong correlated equilibria (as defined in any of the alternative definitions of Einy & Peleg, 1995; Ray, 1998; Bloch & Dutta, 2007 , Heller, 2008 . This is different than the coalition-proof case where it is known that there is no inclusion relationship between the sets of ex-ante and ex-post coalition-proof correlated equilibria (as discussed in the referred papers).
3) A simultaneous protocol: The implementation of a simultaneous protocol depends on the ability of players to send and receive messages exactly at the same time. This may be problematic in some real-world environments, and thus we have chosen to construct our protocol in the more robust form of a polite protocol. If simultaneous messages are possible, one can alter the last sub-phase of the constructing phase of our protocol ("revealing the recommendations") into a simultaneous one, by sending the shares of the polynomials that encode the recommendations simultaneously to all players. 17 This allows weakening definition 2.5 of a k-strong punishing strategy profile by omitting the second condition, and only requiring the first condition ( This weaker definition, allows the implementation of a larger set of k-strong correlated equilibria.
4) Cryptographic protocols:
In situations in which the players are computationally restricted and one assumes the existence of "one-way" functions, it is possible to construct a protocol that implements any k-strong correlated equilibrium as a k-strong Nash equilibrium, without the restriction / 2 k n < , as discussed in Goldreich et al. (1987) , Gossner (1998) , Dodis et al. (2000) , Urbano and Vila (2002) , Lepinski et al. (2004) , Abraham et al. (2006) , and the references within.
